The Pragmatism of Iraqi Kurds
Thursday, May 04, 2006
Stratfor.com
Masoud Barzani & Jalal TalabaniGeopolitical Diary: The Pragmatism of Iraqi Kurds There has been a sequence of events and public statements this week involving the Kurds that, on the whole, tend to argue against the popular opinion that their eventual goal is to secede from Iraq and form an independent state. First, Kurdish deputies in the Iraq parliament spoke out about territorial incursions by Iranian forces, who have recently struck out at the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northwestern Iraq.
Parliament speaker Mahmud Mashhadani has called on the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries to investigate the reported Iranian raids. Second, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said Baghdad is using diplomacy in efforts to stop the Iranians' shelling of Kurdish rebel positions in the north, and that the government does not expect an incursion by ground forces.
"The Iraqi government is making necessary contacts with the countries concerned and with international sides," he said. "There were some violations, but we do not think that there is a present threat or possibility of major incursion." Zebari added that, despite some "sticky issues and problems," the cross-border attacks "should be handled through diplomatic means." Finally, the PKK warned that it would retaliate against any attacks authorized by Turkey or Iran against its bases in northern Iraq. Senior commander Murat Karayilan said at a press conference in the northern Iraqi town of Raniyah that if Tehran and Ankara continued to strike at PKK bases or those of other Kurdish factions, his group would launch a guerilla war in Turkey.
Karayilan said the PKK, which is based in Turkey, is not active in Iran, but that its Iranian counterpart has bases along the Iraq-Iran border. What is interesting about these three events is that, when laid side by side, it appears the Iraqi Kurds are willing to use their ethnic brethren residing in Turkey and Iran (and even Syria) as a bargaining chip, seeking to improve their own standing within Iraq -- but that they are not willing to antagonize Ankara, Tehran or Damascus by joining forces with the other Kurds in the region in a push for an independent Kurdistan. There are several explanations for this position. First, and fairly obvious, is the fact that even if the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran pooled their resources, they would be no match for the military forces of even one of those states, let alone all three combined. Second, the Iraqi Kurds are sufficiently factionalized in and of themselves that only chaos could be expected if other groups were thrown into the fray.
There is a well-known love-hate dynamic between the KDP -- led by Masoud Barzani, head of the regional Kurdistani government in northern Iraq -- and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two parties have a decent working relationship, but it is clouded by uncertainty: Both have been shaped by their respective leaders, and there are questions as to what would happen if either man was no longer at the helm.
Nor can it be forgotten that besides these two groups, there is the Islamic Union of Kurdistan -- which bagged five seats in Parliament -- the largest for any of the smaller groups following the four principal political blocs. That it was able to do so on a proportional representation system underscores that it wields considerable influence in the northern region; the Kurdistani Gathering bloc, led by the KDP and PUK, is the dominant Kurdish group, with 53 seats in the legislature.
A third consideration is that the Iraqi Kurds wield more internal political power than any other Kurdish communities in the region. On the surface, it would appear that they would, therefore, be the best candidates to launch a bid for independence. But it is their very political strength within Iraq that, paradoxically, prevents them from doing so. The Kurds control the presidency, foreign ministry, deputy premiership, and other key portfolios in Baghdad, not to mention having an autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, and a decent shot at controlling significant Iraqi oil revenues. Stated differently, the Kurds of Iraq likely will find it in their interest to pursue their political fortunes within the existing state rather than attempting to create a new one of their own.
Therefore, when the Kurds talk of federalism in Iraq, it is not with an eye toward laying a foundation for secession, but an end in itself. Proactively aiming for anything beyond a federalist structure would jeopardize the gains they have made since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
Within Iraq, the Kurds have power and leverage; outside of Iraq, there is real danger of losing political power and perhaps even of physical destruction by the states that view them as a threat. It is little wonder, then, that both Talabani and Barzani are emerging as advocates of Iraq's territorial integrity.
They have established ties to Iran and Syria, and they have exhibited an unwillingness to antagonize Turkey -- despite Ankara's long suppression of Kurdish political aspirations. The Iraqi Kurds are fully aware that, should they make any moves toward independence from Baghdad's rule, the Kurds of neighboring states naturally would follow suit -- and the safety of the entire community, let alone their own Interests and standing, would be at risk. A viable secession bid from any given state would require support from a third party -- in all likelihood, a neighboring state or a strong regional player.
In the case of Iraqi Kurds, all such potential allies see the breakup of Iraq as detrimental to their own interests, and Washington has no interest in supporting an independent Kurdistan. That essentially rules out the breakup of Iraq by secession. It does not, of course, rule out the possibility of failure stemming from the Sunni-Shiite split or other factors.
If such forces led to the collapse of the Iraqi state, the situation would be altogether different, and the Kurds would be forced to change their calculus. But under any circumstances that can be envisioned, an independent Kurdistan rising from the ashes of Iraq quickly would become a major battleground for the region. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the Kurds of Iraq should prefer their current position --
limited but real power within an existing state -- to unity with their ethnic brethren and the very real possibility of wielding no power at all.
Nor can it be forgotten that besides these two groups, there is the Islamic Union of Kurdistan -- which bagged five seats in Parliament -- the largest for any of the smaller groups following the four principal political blocs. That it was able to do so on a proportional representation system underscores that it wields considerable influence in the northern region; the Kurdistani Gathering bloc, led by the KDP and PUK, is the dominant Kurdish group, with 53 seats in the legislature.
A third consideration is that the Iraqi Kurds wield more internal political power than any other Kurdish communities in the region. On the surface, it would appear that they would, therefore, be the best candidates to launch a bid for independence. But it is their very political strength within Iraq that, paradoxically, prevents them from doing so. The Kurds control the presidency, foreign ministry, deputy premiership, and other key portfolios in Baghdad, not to mention having an autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, and a decent shot at controlling significant Iraqi oil revenues. Stated differently, the Kurds of Iraq likely will find it in their interest to pursue their political fortunes within the existing state rather than attempting to create a new one of their own.
Therefore, when the Kurds talk of federalism in Iraq, it is not with an eye toward laying a foundation for secession, but an end in itself. Proactively aiming for anything beyond a federalist structure would jeopardize the gains they have made since the fall of Saddam Hussein.
Within Iraq, the Kurds have power and leverage; outside of Iraq, there is real danger of losing political power and perhaps even of physical destruction by the states that view them as a threat. It is little wonder, then, that both Talabani and Barzani are emerging as advocates of Iraq's territorial integrity.
They have established ties to Iran and Syria, and they have exhibited an unwillingness to antagonize Turkey -- despite Ankara's long suppression of Kurdish political aspirations. The Iraqi Kurds are fully aware that, should they make any moves toward independence from Baghdad's rule, the Kurds of neighboring states naturally would follow suit -- and the safety of the entire community, let alone their own Interests and standing, would be at risk. A viable secession bid from any given state would require support from a third party -- in all likelihood, a neighboring state or a strong regional player.
In the case of Iraqi Kurds, all such potential allies see the breakup of Iraq as detrimental to their own interests, and Washington has no interest in supporting an independent Kurdistan. That essentially rules out the breakup of Iraq by secession. It does not, of course, rule out the possibility of failure stemming from the Sunni-Shiite split or other factors.
If such forces led to the collapse of the Iraqi state, the situation would be altogether different, and the Kurds would be forced to change their calculus. But under any circumstances that can be envisioned, an independent Kurdistan rising from the ashes of Iraq quickly would become a major battleground for the region. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the Kurds of Iraq should prefer their current position --
limited but real power within an existing state -- to unity with their ethnic brethren and the very real possibility of wielding no power at all.
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